Table of Contents The Joint Statement on Micro Radio
Annotated Web Links
Micro Radio Art Gallery Chapter 1: Introduction |
Sailing the Spectrum from Pirates to Micro Broadcasters:
CHAPTER 2
Literature Review First this chapter describes the general historical background of the development of unlicensed broadcasting. Starting with the Radio Act of 1927 and moving forward to the advent of modern unlicensed broadcasting in the 1980s, these developments are examined through a legal and regulatory lens. Second, the motivations of past unlicensed broadcasters are discussed to provide a comparison to current micro broadcasters' motivations. Third, literature concerned with short-wave pirates, off-shore broadcasters, and clandestines is reviewed. Examining these other forms of unlicensed broadcasting and the FCC's response to them demonstrates the rationale underlying the FCC's present posture towards micro radio. Fourth, the specific legal and Constitutional issues concerning the federal government's right to regulate the airwaves are presented as these issues form the basis for the FCC's current regulatory stance toward micro broadcasters. Fifth, specific examples of FCC enforcement policies and regulations and how they are applied to different types of unlicensed broadcasting are described. This literature review concludes with an overview of the current status of micro broadcasting in the United States. Finally, research questions are posed based on the review of the literature.
History It was just before the Radio Act of 1927 that pirate radio was first discussed by broadcasting historians. All earlier legislation was unable to deal with the incredible proliferation of broadcasters and receivers flooding the United States in the middle to late 1920s. After the courts determined that regulations established in the early 1920s were unenforceable, broadcasting entered what was called the "break down of the law" period (Barnouw, 1966). In the first six months of 1927, the number of stations in the United States increased by 200, and the total wattage almost doubled. During this chaotic period, the first instances of "wave piracy" occurred. Because of the technology in use at the time, certain frequencies were superior to others. During this time, stations would invade a frequency that they considered superior without regard as to who happened to be using it at that moment. This led to electromagnetic mayhem and made much of the spectrum static and gibberish (Barnouw, 1966). The Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which was established as part of the Radio Act of 1927, immediately set about clearing up the airwaves. A technical-solution model was used: Those stations with superior equipment and power were given the best frequencies. This meant that commercial stations, especially chain or network broadcasting stations, came to dominate radio. At that time, a station's possession of a frequency could be challenged at a license renewal hearing every three months. This led to a variation of piracy, with the powerful stations preying on the weaker stations by constantly challenging them for their licenses (McChesney, 1993). These constant challenges depleted the weaker stations' resources and left many of them unable to adequately defend themselves. Most often these were the vulnerable educational broadcasters, who could not afford the legal assistance or the technology to upgrade their systems to compete for their channels (McChesney, 1993). The right of the FRC to regulate and grant licenses was confirmed by the courts in 1929 in the case of United States v. American Bond and Mortgage (31 F2d 448), in which A B & M threatened to broadcast after losing its license at a renewal hearing. The first real challenge of the right of the FRC to regulate the airwaves was tried in 1930 as United States v. Fellows. Phipps (1991) explained that George W. Fellows was a British national living in the St. Louis area and operating an unlicensed transmitter. Fellows was charged and found guilty of this as well as interfering with other stations and illegally re-broadcasting programming from other stations without permission. All of this was in violation of the Radio Act of 1927. Fellows contended that the government could not own the airwaves and therefore had no right to regulate them. His court-appointed attorney attempted to use technical information to prove that the airwaves could not be regulated or controlled, but the court refused to let this information be admitted. Because this was the FRC's first challenge, the government apparently decided to make an example of Fellows. He was convicted and sentenced to a year in a federal penitentiary (Phipps, 1991). He vowed to appeal. However, Fellows had an outstanding judgment against him from the Department of Immigration. It was decided that if Fellows submitted to deportation, his sentence would be commuted. He agreed and eventually left the United States for England. Fellows was the only radio pirate who has ever been sentenced to jail for violation of federal communications law. According to Phipps (1991), although this case was tried in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri at St. Louis, no official record of it remains. A search by this researcher confirmed the lack of court documentation related to this case. Phipps (1991) discovered the Fellows case through a review of newspaper articles. After Fellows, only fines have been used to punish and dissuade unlicensed broadcasters. McChesney (1993) noted that the Radio Act of 1927 was strengthened and confirmed by the Communications Act of 1934. At that time the FRC was replaced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). From 1934 to the onset of World War II, the only recorded instances of radio piracy consisted of stations that either had not bothered to apply for a license, or those that considered themselves too small or too part-time to need a license (Jones, 1988). Often there was the belief that if a station's signal did not cross state lines it was not subject to federal regulation. Stations in violation of the law were easy for the FCC to locate because most of them operated in the open and freely announced their locations over the air. By 1937, unlicensed broadcasting had virtually disappeared from the spectrum. With the coming of the war, the subsequent loss of individuals to the war effort, equipment scarcity, and war-time restrictions, unlicensed broadcasting activities in the United States for the most part ceased to exist (Yoder, 1990). After the Second World War, the nature of unlicensed broadcasting appeared to change. With the occasional exception of someone broadcasting in ignorance of the law (as illustrated by Steve Jones [1988]), most of the activity switched to short-wave frequencies. Much of the information on pirate radio, especially short-wave pirates, comes from the research done by radio enthusiast Andrew Yoder. His book, Pirate Radio Stations (1990), is considered definitive and cited in most research on the subject. The research done by Yoder for this book was completed prior to his being issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL) for unlicensed short-wave operations in June of 1992. The FCC had suspected him of unlicensed broadcasting starting in 1991 (FCC, 1992d). Data taken from the Yoder (1990) text primarily deals with historical information concerning unlicensed radio. Generally, radio hobbyists are the sole audience for these pirates. Many short-wave pirates went on to broadcast on the normal band. The FCC does not take into consideration mode or potential audience when enforcing communications law. As indicated by FCC news releases (1990a-e), these pirates were considered more dangerous because the short-wave part of the spectrum was used for international communications, navigation systems, military traffic, and a host of other operations. Short-wave pirates dominated unlicensed broadcasting up until the 1980s. The presence of normal band pirate broadcasters began to be felt in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the political turmoil of the times (Yoder, 1990). An example of normal band piracy in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the Falling Star Network (Yoder, 1990). Based in Yonkers, NY, it consisted of two AM and two FM stations. Started as a response to the lack of representation of youth culture on commercial radio, the Falling Star Network commenced operating in 1970. The operators felt that Yonkers needed its own community radio station, so they built one. The network operated for more than a year before repeated FCC warnings forced the station to shut down. At its height, this network had 50 volunteers and operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (Yoder, 1990). The "owners," J. P. Ferraro and Alan Weiner, 22 and 16 years old, respectively, would later go on to participate in one of the most notable off-shore pirate operations in United States' history, that of "Radio Sarah" (Bender, 1988). (Radio Sarah is discussed in detail on pp. 13-14 of this thesis.) It was in the early 1980s that broadcast piracy entered its current phase. This phenomenon will be examined in several specific areas of this chapter: short-wave, off-shore broadcasting, and clandestine radio; legal, regulatory, and Constitutional considerations; and the current status of the micro broadcasting movement. However, before describing the current phase of broadcast piracy, the apparent motivations of these unlicensed broadcasters are discussed.
Motivations
Other Related Forms of Unlicensed Broadcasting
Off-shore Broadcasting There have been three cases of unlicensed off-shore broadcasting in the United States. The earliest, most successful, and by far most obscure pirate station, plied the coast of Southern California in 1933. This pirate station was known as RKXR and was described by both Kneitel (1983) and Yoder (1990). RKXR operated from the S.S. City of Panama, a Panamanian registered ship that was supposed to be a floating advertisement for that nation's tourism and industry. The station itself was licensed as an experimental, non-commercial broadcaster of 500 to 1000 watts by the Panamanian government. However, in practice the City of Panama was a floating speak-easy and casino. The station actually produced 5,000 watts of commercials and popular music (Kneitel, 1983). Many Southern California businesses flocked to the station because of the lack of West Coast stations and its high wattage. Despite government protests lodged even before the station went on the air, RKXR began broadcasting in May 1933. The Panamanian government saw the United States' request to revoke the station's license as an insult and refused to act. RKXR was so powerful that its signal forced many other legal stations off the air. When the FRC was slow to act, those stations asked RKXR directly to change frequencies. Those requests were met by demands for money - literally thousands of dollars (Kneitel, 1983). Actions like these led the U.S. State Department to finally convince Panama of the station's true identity. Panama formally canceled the station's license and registration of the vessel in June 1933. However, due to red tape the station remained on the air until August 1933 when the ship was finally towed into Los Angeles harbor by the Coast Guard. This incident set a precedent concerning off-shore pirate radio that would eventually lead to international laws concerning its prohibition (Kneitel, 1983). Up until the early 1970s there was no record of any attempt to broadcast illegally off the coast of the United States. The reason for this is noted by Boyd (1983) as well as Jones (1988): Off-shore broadcasting is technically difficult and very expensive. The European off-shore pirates sold advertising and were commercial alternatives to state-run broadcasting, whereas in the United States a person with enough money to go off-shore could easy afford a land-based operation. Jones (1988), Boyd (1983), and Phipps (1990) discussed how, in 1973, America had its first modern pirate. The Reverend Carl McIntire was a fundamentalist preacher who was particularly vocal in his attacks on Communism and the United States' "no-win" policy in Vietnam. Soon after McIntire legally acquired a pair of radio stations in 1965 (WXUR AM/FM), the FCC moved to reject his license renewal (Boyd, 1983). The FCC cited misrepresentation by McIntire in the renewal process and Fairness Doctrine violations for its action. It took until 1973 for McIntire's appeals to run out and his stations to go off the air. McIntire then openly defied the right of the government to take him off the air. He leased an old minesweeper called the Columbus, renamed it the Oceanic, and installed a 10-kilowatt RCA transmitter (Boyd, 1983). One of McIntire's goals was to attract the attention of the government, press, and public, so he made no secret of his intentions. The Oceanic was towed to a location off New Jersey, and began transmitting on September 19, 1973 (Boyd, 1983). The vessel was positioned just outside the three-mile limit. The area inside this zone is under U.S. jurisdiction; outside the zone is considered international waters (Bender, 1988). McIntire had made his point. Because of interference with licensed stations he broadcast only that one day. A restraining order was issued by the courts to enjoin further broadcasts. McIntire argued that the government had no jurisdiction over him because he was in international waters (Boyd, 1983). However, Section 301e of the Communications Act (1934) indicated that a United States' registered vessel, such as the Oceanic, came under FCC jurisdiction. Moreover, his broadcasts violated the 1959 Geneva Telecommunications Convention, which outlawed pirate broadcasting from international waters (Boyd, 1983). Further appeals were filed under the doctrine of "un-clean hands."1 The defense lawyers implied that the United States government had itself violated the treaty by its "Radio Free Europe" broadcasts that violated the airspace of nations, over those nations' objections. The judge rejected this argument and, with McIntire's appeals and money exhausted, his case passed into history (Phipps, 1990). The most recent and widely know case of off-shore broadcasting was that of Radio New York International (RNI), also known as "Radio Sarah." This case was covered by Jones (1988) and Phipps (1990) from a mass communication perspective, Bender (1988) from a regulatory legal angle, and in numerous newspaper articles and magazine features, the most detailed by Kuipers (1989). With the understanding that the FCC did not have jurisdiction over a foreign registered ship operating a broadcasting station in international waters, and an investment of several months and $200,000, RNI went on the air on July 23, 1987. Organized by former pirate Alan Weiner (see p. 8 of this thesis), RNI was billed as an alternative to commercial rock stations (Kuipers, 1989). Although it played many of the same artists as commercial stations, its selections, in terms of songs and albums, differed from commercial stations' selections. After two days of broadcasting outside the territorial limit near Long Beach, NY, the Sarah, a Honduran-registered ship that carried the transmitter, was approached by the FCC and the Coast Guard. The Sarah's crew members were informed that they were in apparent violation of national and international law and were ordered to cease broadcasting; they refused. After five days, and with permission from the Honduran government, the FCC and the Coast Guard boarded the Sarah with guns drawn. They arrested the staff and dismantled the studio equipment (Kuipers, 1989). Not only were Weiner and disc jockey Ivan Rothstein charged with operating an off-shore pirate station, they also were charged with impeding an FCC investigation. In addition, the FCC charged that they were in violation of Article 30, section 1(1) of the International Telecommunications Convention of 1982 (ITC). This section prohibits the operation of a radio broadcast transmitter in international waters. Because this had been entered into United States law, it was considered a civil violation and a criminal act, and therefore justified the arrest of Weiner and Rothstein. As in most FCC actions, all criminal charges were dropped after the defendants promised to desist from future broadcasts. In this instance, the monetary forfeiture was waived as well. The FCC had made its point and the prosecuting attorney felt that it was doubtful the defendants knew they were breaking the law (Bender, 1988; Yoder, 1990). However, the case did not end there. After re-registering the Sarah to a tiny self-proclaimed principality called Sealand, located off the coast of Great Britain, and selling the station to a British company, RNI went back on the air on the short-wave band on September 10, 1988 (Kuipers, 1989). However, the international community did not recognize the sovereignty of Sealand and the vessel was seized again. This time the court made a far-reaching decision: The United States had jurisdiction over any signal that could be received in the United States, despite its origin (Bender, 1988). Although this would seem to indicate that the United States had the right to enter another country to shut down an international signal, the court qualified its ruling to "what is reasonable." After this decision, the FCC again dropped all charges, even though it could have fined the defendants up to $250,000 and imposed up to a five-year prison term. Because the charges were dropped, many important questions were left unanswered. These include the application of Constitutional free speech and access issues, the fact that Article 30 of the ITC had never been enforced by any nation in such a manner, and the question of how the United States would impose its new "jurisdiction" over international broadcasts (Bender, 1988). These off-shore pirates, RKXR, Radio Free America, and RNI, were in search of ways to circumvent the FCC's authority by finding loopholes in the regulatory structure. RKXR and RNI were commercial ventures with, in RNI's case, a veneer of the concept of open and free airwaves. Overtly a political protest, Radio Free America was more McIntire's retribution for the FCC canceling his station licenses. While these stations were high profile, their significance in terms of airwave access and free speech remained minimal. Yet, the impact of these stations was important in defining the scope of spectrum regulation.
Clandestines Clandestine broadcasting was almost exclusively a foreign phenomenon. In an exhaustive study by Nichols and Soley (1987), no mention was made of clandestine radio in the United States. However, they did confirm that the United States government, under the auspices of the CIA, transmitted signals to Cuba and other nations to the south in violation of their airspace. These messages could be classified as coming under the clandestine definition. Nichols and Soley also document the CIA's involvement in similar operations around the globe. The only mention of a true clandestine broadcaster was found in Yoder (1990). This was the Voice of Tomorrow, which broadcast on the short-wave band and the high end of the AM band. According to Yoder (1990), its format was described as highly professional by ACE magazine. The Voice of Tomorrow has broadcast consistently since 1980. Its format had a Ku Klux Klan/Neo-Nazi slant, with shows on white supremacy and the inflammatory rhetoric identified with these groups. It had a possible location in Virginia, although the FCC could not track the station down because its location kept changing (Yoder, 1990).
Legal and Constitutional Considerations The basis for the control and regulation of the broadcast spectrum is the Communications Act of 1934; specifically Section 301(a-f). This act encompasses broadcasting under language from the Radio Act of 1927, which in turn, is taken from public utility regulation (Franklin & Anderson, 1990). Thus, broadcasters are to operate "in the public interest, convenience and necessity" (Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. 303). The need for the Communications Act stemmed from the technical limitations of the medium. Spitzer (1989) discussed what he considered to be the primary points for the regulatory rationale of the Communications Act of 1934. Spitzer's article focused on treating broadcasting differently from other Constitutionally-protected media such as print. Essentially, government justifications for broadcast licensing focused on economic and psychological differences between print and broadcast media. Specifically, these differences were limited spectrum space, industry structure, accessibility, and the perceived superiority of print over electronic communication. An additional justification was the "government property" rationale (Spitzer, 1989, p. 991), the claim that the government (which keeps the spectrum in "trust" for the public) has the jurisdiction to regulate the spectrum as it sees fit. Especially important to the issue of government control was the notion of the spectrum scarcity rationale. As noted previously, a lack of space on the broadcast band was a major factor in the content of both the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934. "Scarcity rationales have provided the basis for much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of broadcast regulation" (Spitzer, 1989, p. 1,007). In National Broadcasting Company v. U.S. (319 US 190, 227, 1943), it was noted that "owning to its physical characteristics, radio, unlike other methods of conveying information, must be regulated and rationed by the government" (Spitzer, 1989, pp. 1,007?1,008). In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC (395 US 367, 388, 1969), 26 years later, the court unanimously defended the scarcity rationale despite arguments that new technology allowed for more efficient use of the spectrum. The court reasoned that demand had increased as well, still allowing for the scarcity rationale. However, in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC (497 U.S. 547, 1990) and the following Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC (110 ScT 717, 1990; a.k.a. Merideth Corporation v. FCC, 809 F. 2d 863 and 867 F. 2d 654, 1989) certiorari denied, the FCC downplayed the scarcity rationale, seeming to question the constitutionality of much of the broadcast regulation, especially in the differentiation between traditional print and broadcast media.2 Spitzer (1989) concluded that, in terms of the government property rationale, the government cannot simply regulate as it sees fit. Thus, Spitzer (1989) argued, "If the government property is a public forum, any regulation of speech is subjected to intense scrutiny" (p. 1,030). In some related cases concerning off-shore broadcasting, the FCC invoked several international treaties that it stated had precluded the existence of such operations. The Communications Act of 1934 (Section 301) did not give the FCC jurisdiction over foreign vessels, nor did it require transmitters on such vessels to obtain a license to broadcast (Communications Act, Section 303t). Thus, the FCC argued that the International Telecommunications Convention (ITC) of 1982 gave the agency jurisdiction over United States citizens broadcasting from foreign-registered vessels. Bender (1988), in his study of international law with regard to the case of "Radio Sarah," suggested that because the case was dismissed after a permanent injunction was obtained, no real test of the applicability of the ITC was proven. Further, Bender (1988) argued that Article 30 of the ITC, which was used as the justification for the seizure of the Sarah, did not explicitly authorize the FCC's actions. Another international treaty that has bearing on this is the High Seas Convention (HSC) of 1958, which dealt with the "contiguous zone" beyond territorial waters, usually five miles (Bender, 1988). This was where the Sarah was located. The convention provided the exercise of control over another nation's vessel within this zone under certain circumstances, such as to "prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations" (Bender, 1988, p. 75). There was no evidence, either in this case or in similar European cases, that pirate broadcasting harmed a nation in any of these areas. Although other nations have enacted specific laws to deal with such occurrences, United States' jurisdiction may not pass a concerted challenge. However, Bender (1988) observed that such a challenge would be unlikely, as most governments have a vested interest in maintaining control over their spectrum space. Bender (1988) further noted that governments were not above manipulating regulations or making broad interpretations to maintain this control, as illustrated by the RNI case. Both Bender (1988) and Spitzer (1989) pointed to the need for a drastic overhaul of United States communications law. The following section discusses these laws as they are related to FCC regulation and enforcement of unlicensed broadcasting.
Regulation and Enforcement The case of BASS-FM in Miami, FL, a low-power pirate located in the poor, violence-prone portion of that city, illustrated the uneven enforcement of the FCC. During the trial of a police officer accused of shooting two black youths who allegedly tried to run him down with a motorcycle, the threat of violence was great. BASS-FM sent a positive message to the community and was considered a calming force by the local authorities (Booth, 1993). Despite BASS-FM's publicity in newspapers such as the Washington Post and the Miami Herald, the FCC did not take action against the station. This is in contrast to previous instances of high-profile unlicensed broadcasting in which the FCC responded with warnings or fines (Booth, 1993; Pugh, 1993). It is unclear why the FCC abandoned cases once permanent injunctions were established. Those pirates involved believed that once a pirate was taken off the air and the territorial imperative of the FCC had been validated, the FCC did not wish to test the actions in court (Ladd, 1987; Phipps, 1990). In fact, permanent injunctions have served the FCC well. Once the injunction is in place, any further violation puts the broadcaster in contempt of court (Bender, 1988; Boyd, 1983). Despite the increasing challenges to FCC authority, the agency had been moving towards obtaining more enforcement powers. A Federal Registry Order by the FCC (47 U.S.C. 115) dated November 11, 1993, stated that the FCC had given itself subpoena power in the case of violations of Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 concerning "the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records" (p .1). When the FCC has levied fines, it has issued a "Notice of Apparent Liability" to those it believes to have engaged in illegal broadcasting. Interestingly, for the FCC to issue a fine, it did not need to have more than basic technical evidence of an infraction, in the form of radio detection finding (FCC, 1992d; correspondence by Andrew Yoder to FCC, 1992). The person accused had to state why he or she should not be fined; a simple denial was not enough. Further, because it was a civil action, the government was not required to appoint counsel to those accused if they could not defend themselves (National Lawyers Guild, 1992).
Current Status of Micro Broadcasting Based on information from the Committee for Democratic Communication (National Lawyers Guild, 1992) and Shields and Ogles (1992), the modern micro broadcasting movement began on November 25, 1986 in a public housing development in Springfield, IL. The one-watt station broadcast openly on 107.1 FM as Black Liberation Radio and was put on the air for about $600. The operator, Mbanna Kantako, a legally blind African-American in his mid-thirties, started the station because he felt that the African-American community in Springfield was not being served by the local media. Kantako felt that because the African-American community had a high illiteracy rate, radio would be the best way to reach this community. He stated: "'Given technology today, using print is like using the pony express instead of air freight'" (Shields & Ogles, 1992, p. 6). His station reached about 1,000 residents in his housing project and had a total range of approximately a mile and a half. Despite police harassment, a raid by the FCC, and a $750 fine, the station stayed on the air (Shields & Ogles, 1992). Coining the term micro broadcasting, Kantako considered it his mission to bring his community together and to empower them (National Lawyers Guild, 1992). With no apparent assets to seize, the FCC has not pursued this case, although the fine is still outstanding. Kantako walked out of the hearing when the FCC refused to provide legal representation. The CDC, part of the National Lawyers Guild, took up Kantako's case and pursued the FCC in the courts on several grounds concerning United States communication. This challenge became increasingly important as the micro broadcasting movement spread across the country. Kantako and Mike Townsend, a social work professor at Sangamond State University in Springfield, IL, put together a videotape on how to construct a micro station, which they distributed widely (Shields & Ogles, 1992). Several other micro broadcasters followed Kantako and Townsend's lead, including Stephen Dunifer in Berkeley, CA and Walter Dunn, Jr., the "Black Rose," in Fresno, CA. Both Dunifer (McHenry, 1995) and Dunn (Graham, 1990) produced videotapes and other materials concerning micro radio station construction and operation. While Dunn had a much more powerful transmitter, 125 watts, like Kantako, Dunn started small (Milner, 1993). These micro broadcasters are discussed in greater detail on the following pages. The common goal of these micro broadcasters was to flood the United States with micro radio stations. This would overload the FCC and force a decision on micro broadcaster's right to operate (Dunifer, 1994). A similar instance occurred with the introduction and mass distribution of citizen band or CB radios. When CB radios first entered the market in the early 1970s, the FCC sought to license them for each unit sold. So many units were sold, and so few people took the time to apply for a license, that the FCC eventually gave up on the licensing idea all together (National Lawyers Guild, 1992). As summarized by the CDC report: "Micro radio practitioners and members of their communities un-served by the present commercially based broadcast system have standing to challenge the FCC policy" (National Lawyers Guild, p. 116). The report sought to confirm this statement by citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC (395 US 367, 390, 1969), in which the court confirmed that the rights of the listeners, not those of the speakers, are paramount. Also noted was the contention that, according to Red Lion, the First Amendment does not differentiate between those with licenses and those without. Walter Dunn, Jr., the "Black Rose" in Fresno, CA, was one of the first micro broadcaster to come to the media's attention, starting in 1987. Reports of Dunn's activities eventually moved beyond the local press (Speizer, 1987), to the wire services ("Bootleg Fresno," 1989), and The Nation magazine (Rodriguez, 1991). Dunn actually began broadcasting in 1985 (Speizer, 1987). He started with a 1/10-watt transmitter, but with public support quickly rose to 125 watts. Like Kantako, Dunn believed that the African-American community was not being served by the local media and did something about it. The FCC had been aware of the broadcasts, but with the closest field office in San Francisco, it had held off acting. This ended in 1987 when Dunn switched to 108 FM. The high end of the FM band is reserved for aircraft use, and the FCC was concerned about interference ("Bootleg Fresno," 1989; Speizer, 1987). The FCC then moved to interdict ("forbid" or "prohibit" [Flexner, 1987, p. 993]) Dunn's broadcasting. Dunn was not hard to find because he had a large radio mast in his backyard. Despite the 1987 raid and a fine, Dunn went back on the air and broadcast a full schedule until 1989 when he was again shut down by the FCC, fined $2,000, and had all his equipment seized (Rodriguez, 1991). With his equipment gone, Dunn started traveling the country to show others how to start their own stations. However, Graham (1990) reported that Dunn was seeking the return of his equipment and was looking into starting a micro television station. Stephen Dunifer, a long-time activist in Berkeley, CA, is the primary organizer behind Free Radio Berkeley (FRB). This station's programming consists of music and political commentary (Ewell, 1995). As reported in the press (Dinkelspiel, 1993; Milner, 1993), Dunifer has been broadcasting in the evening on 88.1 FM since the early 1990s. Dunifer's background in electronics led him to research broadcasting technology and work out designs for micro transmitters. His operation was 10 watts, usually broadcast out-of-doors or from his 1964 Volvo station wagon. Although he had never been caught in the act of unlicensed broadcasting, the FCC fined him twice for a total of $20,000 (Dunifer, 1994). Dunifer also published a newsletter, Reclaiming the Airwaves. In addition, he sold sold micro transmitter kits for about $100 and held workshops on assembling these kits. As described by Dunifer (1994), a micro radio station can be constructed for several hundred dollars, depending on the wattage. Dunifer's newsletter also described other micro broadcasters around the world. As an activist, Dunifer has been involved in various local and national causes (Ewell, 1995). These include the Free Communications Movement and opposition to the Gulf War. The latter was his primary motivation to start Free Radio Berkeley (Milner, 1993). Dunifer's outspoken views concerning government and corporate control, combined with his technical expertise, have brought him to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) attention. During the summer of 1995, an FBI agent visited Dunifer as part of the the government's investigation of the Unabomber. The Unabomber was an individual of technical expertise and strong political views who mailed bombs to a variety of people over the course of several years, resulting in a number of fatalities. Consistent with Dunifer's anarchist philosphies, he declared his innocence, and sent the agent on his way (Ewell, 1995; Noble, 1995). The April 22, 1994 front page of the San Jose Mercury News "Eye" featured another micro broadcaster, Richard Edmonson. Broadcasting at 93.7 FM Wednesdays and Saturdays from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m., San Francisco Liberation Radio (SFLR) programming consisted of music and political commentary (Fine, 1994). Edmonson, like Dunifer, usually broadcast from his vehicle, in this case a Volkswagen van. SFLR received a Notice of Apparent Liability in 1993 for $10,000 from the FCC. Despite these legal troubles Edmonson has continued to broadcast (Fine, 1994). Both Dunifer and Edmonson are being represented by the CDC in San Francisco. According to Edmonson, there were over 200 micro broadcasters operating in the United States (Fine, 1994). Kate Henton, FCC public relations officer in San Francisco, stated, "'We have very good reasons for requiring a license. . . . It's very common for these so called pirate broadcasters to use equipment that is frequency-unstable . . . that can potentially be very dangerous"' (Fine, 1994, p. 38). Usually the FCC had the right to inspect any station at any time to ensure that its equipment was functioning properly (FCC, 1992a). But, because broadcasting licenses were issued only to stations of 100 watts or more (69 FCC 2d 240) and micro broadcasters were well below that, the opportunity for inspection did not exist.
Summary This started to change over the past 25 years as individuals began to explore the possibilities of broadcasting their own signals. However, it was not until the 1980s that a variety of factors came into play that set the stage for the emergence of micro radio. A combination of an improvement in technology, the public's increased familiarity with that technology, and a growing perception by a certain section of the population that they were being excluded from electronic discourse have led to the recent increase in micro broadcasting activities (Ewell, 1995).
Research Questions
RQ 1: a) How did micro broadcasting get started in the San Francisco Bay
Area?
RQ 2: a) What motivates micro broadcasters to go on the air? RQ 3: How has the FCC responded to the micro broadcasting movement? RQ 4: What is the scope of unlicensed broadcasting in the U.S.? Thus, the present study sought to explore the state of micro broadcasting in the San Francisco Bay Area and provide an overview of unlicensed broadcasting activities in the U.S. To address this mission and the research questions listed above, specific qualitative research methods were used. These methods are discussed in the next chapter. |